Vivendi SE
Look-through NAV vs. the share price — the "basket" (sum of its stakes + private assets − net debt) against what the market pays for the holdco. The gap is the discount/premium; watch it widen and narrow. S&P 500 · VIV.PA.
| Universal Music Group (net of hedge) UMG.AS | €3.3B | 85% | |
| Banijay Group BNJ.AS | €683M | 17% | |
| MFE-MediaForEurope (B) MFEB.MI | €378M | 10% | |
| Lagardère MMB.PA | €370M | 9% | |
| Prisa PRS.MC | €46M | 1% | |
| Telecom Italia (ord) TIT.MI | €432M | 11% | |
| Other / private / cash (static, 2025-12) | €450M | net debt €1.8B | |
Post-Dec-2024 RUMP Vivendi — after the four-way split (Canal+/Havas/Louis Hachette were spun OUT to shareholders and now sit on Bolloré's balance sheet directly, NOT here). What remains is an investment vehicle whose NAV is dominated by UMG. UMG is BY FAR the largest asset (~9.9% net economic stake): capital interest was ~14.6% at YE2024 but partly hedged via a forward sale, so net economic exposure ~9.9% — modeled as pctOwned 0.0991 on UMG's full market cap (the hedge means this slightly OVERSTATES clean ownership; if the computed discount prints much wider than ~45%, trim UMG toward the post-hedge figure or move the hedge proceeds into otherNAV/netDebt). Then Banijay ~19.2%, MFE-MediaForEurope B-shares ~15.9% (B = super-voting; A = MFEA.MI), Lagardère ~13.4% (NOT the old 57% — the control block went to Louis Hachette in the spin), a residual Telecom Italia ~2.5% (NOT the old ~23% — sold 15% to Poste Italiane Apr-2025, exited telecoms), Prisa ~11.2%. otherNAV = 100%-owned Gameloft + residual Telefónica + cash — SEED ESTIMATE, the softest input. Net financial debt ~€1,768m (H1-2025). Published holdco discount ~33–50% since the spin (~40% mid-2025). Cross-held with [[holdco]] Bolloré (Bolloré owns 29.3% of Vivendi).
Stake prices + FX live; net debt / private NAV / share counts are estimates — verify against the holdco's NAV statement. Not investment advice.